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Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid
grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends
or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and
social imitative behavior in a coordination problem on a social network.We observe that for interactions on
1D and 2D lattices any amount of social imitation prevents the freezing of the network in domains with
different conventions, thus leading to global consensus. For interactions on complex networks, the interplay
of social and strategic imitation also drives the system towards global consensus while neither dynamics
alone does. We find an optimum value for the combination of imitative behaviors to reach consensus in a
minimum time, and two different dynamical regimes to approach it: exponential when social imitation
predominates, power-law when strategic considerations prevail.
W
hen facing a choice, it is often the case that people do not make the optimal decision1–4. Within the
framework of economics, the explanation for these deviations has been advanced in terms of social
preferences: Agents are not solely motivated bymaterial self-interest but also care positively or negatively
for the material benefits and opinions or considerations of their counterparts5. Models with alternative individual
utility functions have also been put forward in an attempt to incorporate the experimental evidence6,7 and to
consider emotional aspects of the interaction among individuals8,9. Yet another line of thought has resorted to
evolutionary arguments to explain non-selfish behavior10–12. In spite of this progress towards a quantitative under-
standing of human behavior, a number of important questions remain unanswered. One such question relates to
the effect of the interplay between strategic or economic views and social factors to explain people choices in a game.
A very similar question has been also considered from a different perspective. From a sociological viewpoint,
there have been many attempts to uncover the mechanisms underlying the adoption by people of new technolo-
gies, the acceptance and spreading of rumors or in general of new information13–18. For example, a basic model in
this context, proposed by Granovetter17, assumes that a certain amount of social pressure is necessary for a person
to adopt a new concept. The pressure in this model, as in other opinion models, is quantified as the number of
contacts that have already adopted the concept.
Indeed, imitation is an important mechanism through which the social environment may influence strategic
decisions. Imitation has been related to bounded rationality or to a lack of information that compels agents to
copy the strategies of others19. Several proposals have been advanced to describe imitation. For example, it has
been proposed that players might imitate one of their counterparts with a probability proportional to the
difference in the agents’ benefits20. Interestingly, this assumption leads the game to a dynamics equivalent to
that of the so-called replicator equation19–21. Another method to include imitation in a game is the so-called
unconditional imitation. Thismeans that after each round of the game an agent copies the strategy of her coplayer
with highest payoff as long as it is higher than her own. However, it is clear that imitation may not be perfect.
Therefore, in previous works the effect of mixing unconditional imitation with other dynamics such as random
strategy selection has been studied in the context of binary choices22,23. Random decisions help the system to
explore different actions and such explorationmay in fact lead to higher cooperation in public goods or prisoner’s
dilemma games. Similarly, random changes in models of cultural evolution (cultural drift) allow to escape from
frozen states of cultural polarization13.
Our aim in this paper is to go beyond pure randomness and consider, instead of pure random noise, the
interplay of two possible imitation dynamics: One is strategic andmodeled by the unconditional imitation driven
by the game payoff; the other is of social nature and is inspired by the voter model. In the voter model14–16,18, an
agent simply copies the opinion of a randomly selected counterpart. This mechanism favors the spreading of a
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majority option, which in our case will be related to the action taken.
The opinion update rule incorporates thus the effect of the social
pressure regardless of the payoffs obtained in the previous game
round. The social component introduces new features in the
dynamics of the game that may lead to different final configurations
of the system24. It is also important to stress that, in contrast to
random strategy selection (noise), the voter model generates a cor-
related state of opinion in the social network.
We address the above issue by introducing amodel in which social
and strategic considerations drive individual behaviors and study
what occurs depending on the frequency of every type of decision
procedure. To be specific, we choose as our strategic problem a
coordination game (CG)25–27. Coordination is relevant in many daily
actions, from the choice of side on which to drive to the decision on
which technology to rely on through opting for a particular phone
provider. In what follows, we will focus on the pure coordination
game setup, in which the binary choice takes place among equivalent
options. This will allow us to achieve a better understanding of the
interplay of socially motivated and strategic decisions. As we will see
below, even in this simpler setting such interplay will lead to non-
trivial, unexpected, results.
Results
Model description. When playing a pure coordination game, the
desired goal of all players is to make the same choice as their
counterparts. Even if the choice is not the optimal, it is better to
coordinate on a sub-optimal action than to do the opposite of
what the other players do. In this work we consider the simplest
version of such a coordination game: When two individuals play,
they choose between two possible actions, obtaining a payoff of 1 if
they choose the same action and 0 otherwise. Players are located in
the nodes of a social network, which represents their social context.
In other words, the people with whom they have to interact and,
eventually, to try to achieve coordination. Every player plays a
coordination game with each of her neighbors in the network,
subject to the constraint that the chosen action is the same for all
those games. Of course, when the game is played in a heterogeneous
network, the best decision to make depends on the number of
opponents choosing every action. Still, the optimal situation both
individually and globally is when all players make the same decision.
To this game-theoretical setup, we have to add the dynamics,
namely, the manner in which players update their choices in time.
Actually, this is the key point we are analyzing, so let us describe this
aspect in detail. Firstly, strategic decisions, i.e., those aimed at
improving the payoff players obtain from the game, take place by
means of the unconditional imitation (UI) rule as described above28:
After every round, players imitate the action of their best performing
neighbor, provided that such neighbor receives a larger payoff than
the player herself. Subsequently, payoffs are set to zero, a new
instance of the game is played, and so on. The final configuration
of a population evolving in this manner depends not only on the
evolution rule but also on the topology. For example, in a well mixed
population (described by a complete network, implying that every
player interacts directly with every other one) perfect coordination is
reached in one time step (consensus); on the other hand, in one- and
two-dimensional regular lattices the dynamics leads to disordered
(non-coordinated) frozen configurations, while on complex net-
works the precise topology of the system can either enhance or hin-
der the reaching of complete coordination29,30.
The updating procedure we have described in the preceding para-
graph is of a strategic nature, driven by the goal of improving one’s
payoff. To this behavior, we incorporate another of social nature: An
imitative, non-strategic dynamics solely driven by social considera-
tions in which players imitate others without considering how this
will affect their payoffs. Such an update rule can be well described by
the voter model (VM)31: At every round of the game, a neighboring
agent is picked up at random and the player imitates her choice. It is
important to keep inmind that the voter dynamics in d5 1, 2 regular
lattices orders the system. Spatial domains of each of the two possible
coordinated states grow in time (unbounded growth in the infinite
size limit). This is described by dynamical laws for the average den-
sity of active links nA(t). The active links are defined as those con-
necting agents with different choices. On the contrary, in the well
mixed case, on lattices with dimension d $ 3 and also in complex
networks of high effective dimensionality there is no continuous
growth of domains of coordination. The voter dynamics leads to a
dynamical metastable disordered state with a constant value for nA(t)
in which there is short range coexistence of the two equivalent coor-
dination options. The system remains in this long lived metastable
state up to a time proportional to the system size, in which finite size
fluctuations take the system to a fully coordinated state (nA(t)50).
Note that this implies that the system remains disordered in the
infinite size limit18,32–35.
In order to make progress towards our goal of understanding the
relative role and importance of the two kinds of dynamics, we con-
sider a system of N agents on a graph. Each agent can interact only
with her nearest neighbors in the network. At each elementary time
step, we pick up an agent i at random that plays the game with her
neighbors, as they also dowith their own neighbors. Once the game is
over and a payoff value is assigned the agent i updates her choice. She
does so ‘‘socially’’, i.e., according to the voter dynamics with pro-
bability q, and strategically by unconditional imitation with
probability 1 2 q.
Simulations. We have carried out a thorough simulation program
considering different forms for the social networks on which players
interact. We begin the summary of our results by reporting on the
two simplest situations, low dimensional regular lattices and
complete networks, which will allow us to develop our first
intuitions of the mechanisms controlling the model behavior.
One- and two-dimensional lattices. In the limit of pure voter
dynamics, q 5 1, the system orders with nA(t) approaching zero as
t21/2 in d 5 1 or (ln t)21 in d 5 2, while in the limit q 5 0 (pure
unconditional imitation) a frozen disordered state is the ultimate fate
of the system. The temporal evolution of nA(t) for arbitrary values of
q is displayed in Figure 1 for lattices of one and two dimensions. A
first aspect to notice from pannels 1a and 1b is that consensus is
always reached as long as q. 0. As can be observed in panels c and d
of Figure 1, the mechanism responsible for the consensus is the
nucleation of the initial domains containing agents making a homo-
geneous choice. Competition between neighboring domains with
opposite choices then takes place until eventually the fluctuations
and finite system size lead to a symmetry breaking and to the selec-
tion of a single option as dominant. The introduction of the voter
dynamics is the main responsible for the symmetry breaking, irre-
spective of how low q is in so far as it is non-zero.
As a second social network, we now turn to complete graphs in
which each agent interacts with every other agent. The results in this
topology correspond to the mean-field limit of the model. In this
topology, the two limits of q in the model behave in an opposite
manner. The two options survive in a dynamic state if the update
is done with the voter dynamics alone q5 1, while the consensus is
reached in one step for the case of unconditional imitation, q 5 0.
Note that this is similar to the case of low dimensional lattices,
although inverting the outcome of the q limits. If the value of q ,
1, the symmetry between both choices is broken and one option
eventually becomes dominant. In this case, it is the presence of
unconditional imitation the factor that helps to break this symmetry
and leads to the ordering the system.
The two previous network topologies may be regarded as bench-
marks. While they have very particular properties that facilitate their
numerical and analytical treatment, they cannot be taken as valid
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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models for more realistic social interactions. Most of the empirical
evidence points to a topological organization of social networks as
sparse complex graphs. To take this into account, we now proceed
with the study of the game on networks generated with the Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi (ER) and the Molloy-Reed algorithms36. The main difference
between both type of random networks is the heterogenity of the
number of nodes’ connections (degree). The distribution of nodes’
degrees in ER graphs is Poissonian, while in the Molloy-Reed net-
works it decays as a power-law with an exponent b.
The sparsity of links and the small world effect bring an interesting
feature to our mixed model. In contrast to low dimensional lattices
and complete graphs, the dynamics does not order the system in any
of the two limits of q. The voter dynamics alone (q 5 1) displays a
long lived dynamical state, while the game with only unconditional
imitation (q 5 0) falls into a non-coordinated frozen state. Sur-
prisingly, our simulation results show that the combination of both
imitation dynamics (strategic1 social) changes the final outcome of
the system. When both types of imitation are combined, the system
orders reaching a fully coordinated state in a time which does not
scale with system size. We have developed some analytical ap-
proaches to understand how this occurs that will be discussed below.
In a nutshell, the combination of voter stochasticity and uncon-
ditional imitation, which drives the system towards the creation of
local majorities, is responsible for the selection of one of the two
choices and its spreading. As a representative example of the time
evolution of the system, Fig. 2 shows the time evolution of nA(t) for a
Figure 1 | Decay of the active links with time: a, for a unidimensional system (N5 1000) with different values of q; b, for a bidimensional system (N5 30
3 305 900). c and d, diagrams showing the system evolution in two dimensional lattices withN5 753755 5625 and two values of q: c for q5 0 and d for
q 5 0.2. Yellow and blue represent the two possible choices. The initial conditions for the actions are the same in both panels and are selected at random.
Figure 2 | Active bond decay for a system in an Erdos-Renyi network
(Ækæ5 9) for q5 0.7 and different system sizes. The results are averaged
over 100 realizations.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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dynamics with an intermediate value of q and for different system
sizes. It can be seen how the system orders relatively fast and that
increasing the system size beyond a certain value of N does not
substantially change the picture.
As a practical way to measure the velocity with which the system
reaches full coordination, we define the characteristic time t as the
time in which the density of active links falls below nA(t)5 1022. As
this is an arbitrary definition, we have tested that decreasing the
threshold by orders of magnitude does not change the nature of
our results. Therefore, we stick to this value for the sake of convi-
nience in the numerical simulations. When t is depicted versus q in
Figure 3, a special value for q, q*, for which t is minimum is found.
This value q* represents thus an optimum mixture of the two imita-
tion dynamics in order to achieve full coordination in the minimum
time. The existance of a q* is robust to a change in the network
topology as can be also seen in Figure 3. The introduction of different
topologies changes the particular value of q* but does not change the
general scenario, as can be seen from the comparison of panels a and
b (ER networks with different Ækæ) and panels c and d (scale-free
networks with different b).
Another remarkable property of the dynamics of this system is the
different way in which nA(t) decays when q is above or below q*.
Figure 4 shows in detail the evolution of nA(t) for values of q in each
of these regimes. For q *v q there is a power-law decay, which
becomes exponential if instead q *> q. The identification of value
of q for which the functional form of the nA(t) decay changes in
nature is hard to obtain numerically but within the uncertainty of
our simulations that value seems consistent with q*.
The power-law decay of nA(t) , t2c for q , q* reserves us a final
surprise. c changes with q, decreasing when qR 0 (see Fig. 5a). This
ba
c d
Figure 3 | The characteristic time for ordering t as a function of q. a: for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with Ækæ5 9 and different system sizes. b: same as in a but
Ækæ5 14. c: scale-free networkwith exponentb5 3.5, and d: scale-free networkwithb5 2.5. Note the logarithmic scale of the vertical axis in panel a and d.
a b
Figure 4 | Active link decays for a system in an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networkwith different values of q. In a, for Ækæ5 9 andN5 8000, while in bwith Ækæ5 9 and
N 5 16000.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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and the analytical expressions found in the next calculations are remin-
iscent of the dynamics of glassy systems where a similar exponent
decreases with the inverse of the temperature37. As a final numerical
result, Figure 5b shows the apparent divergence of the characteristic
time t in the other limit, qR 1, for an almost pure voter dynamics. As
will be discussed next, this behavior, t, 1/(12 q), can be understood
with our analytical calculations.
Analytical approach. The key for a correct understanding of how the
dynamics works in our model is to evaluate the interplay of the
mechanism of imitation at the local and global scales of the
network. In order to shed light to the inner mechanisms of the
dynamics, we make use of a very simple network model, where the
two levels are clearly discernible. We consider a system composed ofM
cliques (totally connected subgraphs), each one of n 1 1 nodes. Each
node of a clique has n connections internal to the clique and C external
ones. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that C is equal for all the
nodes and that it is a fraction a of the internal connections, C 5 an.
Now, let us focus on the voter dynamics. If Ai is the number of
agents playing one of the two choices, say choice A, in clique i, and ri
5Ai/(n1 1) is the density ofA players, the variation in time of ri due
to the voter contribution to the dynamics is
dri tð Þ
dt
 
VM
~
1
M
a
1za
r{rið Þ, ð1Þ
with a5 n/C and where r5 Æriæ is the average density of choiceA in
the full network. Analogously, we can evaluate the contribution of
unconditional imitation:
dri tð Þ
dt
 
UI
~
1
M
H ri{
1
2
za r{
1
2
  
{ri tð Þ
 
, ð2Þ
whereH[?] is the Heaviside function. Equation (2) follows from the
fact that the pay-off of an agent is the number of her neighbors
choosing her same action. As a consequence, an agent k changes
her choice of action by unconditional imitation, say from A to B,
whenever one of her neighbors j choosing B has a larger number of
neighbors choosing B in comparison with the number of neighbors
of k choosingA. Then, because each agent has a probability q per time
unit to evolve according to voter dynamics and 1 2 q to evolve
through unconditional imitation, the general evolution equation
for ri is
dri tð Þ
dt
~q
dri tð Þ
dt
 
VM
z 1{qð Þ dri tð Þ
dt
 
UI
: ð3Þ
The final outcome of the game in the two extremes q 5 0 or q 5 1
can be obtained from Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. If q 5 0 (only
unconditional imitation), the density ri tends to r?i ~0 or 1 for large
values of t and each clique will end up in a different frozen config-
uration according to its initial conditions. On the other hand, if q5 1
(only voter dynamics) it tends to ri5 r, that is, the system converges
to an active disordered configuration conserving the overall density
of choices. Finally, for intermediate q values, if 0 , q , 1, both
conditions must hold to obtain a stationary state. This implies that
the system must reach full coordination.
In order to understand how the system converges to consensus
close to the limits of q, it is convenient to sum up both members of
equation (3) over the cliques, and to divide byM. Since (Siri)/M5 r,
we get a single expression for r
dr tð Þ
dt
~ 1{qð Þ 1
M
XM
i~1
H ri tð Þ{
1
2
za r tð Þ{ 1
2
  
{r tð Þ
( )
: ð4Þ
In the limit qR 1, unconditional imitation is rare and we can assume
that the voter dynamics is much faster. This means that the system
will be homogeneizated before reaching a frozen state (riR r), so
that the Heaviside function can be written as
H ri tð Þ{
1
2
za r tð Þ{ 1
2
  
~H 1zað Þ r tð Þ{ 1
2
  
~H r{1=2ð Þ
and then Equation (4) becomes
dr tð Þ
dt
< 1{qð Þ H r{ 1
2
 
{r
 
~
{ 1{qð Þr if rv 1
2
,
1{qð Þ 1{rð Þ if rw 1
2
:
8><
>: ð5Þ
If we focus on the active bond density nA(t) close to consensus where
nA< r(12 r), the previous equation implies that nA, exp[2 (12
q)t], fromwhere one can see that the ordering is exponential and that
the characteristic time scales as tq*
1
1{q
. This behavior is numer-
ically confirmed in Figure 5b.
Calculations in the limit qR 0 require a different approach. It is
possible to justify the dependence of the exponent c on q inserting a
generic functional form r(t), t2c into Equation (4). For very small q
the dynamics is initially dominated by unconditional imitation, so
that each clique reaches soon a consensus state. In this way, the term
withH[?] in Equation (4) counts only the cliques with choice A and
so it becomes close to the global variable r except for small fluctua-
tions that vanish for q going to zero. If we assume that the term with
H[?] can be substituted by r 1 d and if, for instance, the system is
going towards consensus on the B choice, then dr/dt < dnA/dt and
jdj < (1 2 q)ct2(11c). This relation implies that c is a function of q,
which vanishes for qR 0 and diverges for a particular q value that
numerically we have identified with q*.
a b
Figure 5 | Characterization of the functional decay of nA(t) in the two extremes of q. In both cases, the networks are Erdo¨s-Re´nyi with Ækæ5 9 and a size
of N 5 8000. a: behavior of the power-law exponent of the active bond decay as a function of q (q , q*). b: behavior of the characteristic time in the
exponential regime as a function of 1 2 q. The fit gives tq , (1 2 q)2j with j < 0.95.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Discussion
In this work we have studied a game dynamics based on the interplay
between strategic and random imitation. Our starting consideration
is that in many socio-economic systems the process of imitation can
be biased by social pressure as much as by strategic decisions. The
model analyzed here is characterized by a parameter qwhich relative
weight of each of these dynamics on the evolution of agents’ choices.
With q5 1, the system evolves by pure voter dynamics, whichmeans
that a random neighbor is imitated; on the other hand, for q5 0 the
agents take strategic decisions and copy the action of their best per-
forming neighbor.
As an initial benchmark, we have considered regular topologies.
We observed that any amount of mixing in the dynamic rules leads
the system towards a final consensus where only one strategy sur-
vives. This occurs due to an opposite balance of forces: in complete
graphs (i.e. in the mean-field approximation), where each agent is
directly connected with everyone else and then has a perfect and
complete information, strategic decisions are needed to reach con-
sensus, but on low-dimensional lattices, where agents have informa-
tion only about their closest proximity, a grade of random imitative
dynamics is necessary for a population to reach a complete ordering
(consensus for q? 0). In practice, the system needs special ‘‘noises’’
to avoid either the dynamic trap of the voter dynamics or the freezing
onto local consensus incompatible with other regions of the network.
We then proceeded to study situations closer to real social net-
works, such as heterogeneous graphs. There, we found a very inter-
esting result: Pure dynamics, whether strategic or voter, leaves the
system disordered, but any amount ofmixing of them allows to reach
total consensus. Summarizing, we can state that if in low-dimen-
sional lattices noise is needed to reach consensus, and in mean field
strategic incentive is necessary, on heterogeneous networks both
mechanisms are needed. Moreover, there exist a perfect amount of
mixing embodied by q* that leads to the fastest ordering of the
system. The actual value of q* depends on the details of the particular
network but it seems to exist always as long as the graphs is sparse
and displays small-world effect. The dynamics of the system changes
above and below q*. In particular, it becomes extraordinarily slow for
q values close to zero with a behavior that reminds of glassy systems.
These results may contribute to the understanding of the social
choice dynamics observed in real life situations. Indeed, a mech-
anism like the one we are considering here might be at work when
people make choices about basically equivalent choices, such as
phone providers, or computer brands, in which social interaction
is relevant to the choice. If people were only strategic, we would
observe complete market freezing in groups that chose different
alternatives; if people were only imitative, they would be continu-
ously changing their choice as strategic considerations played no
role. Instead, in real life the market share of the different options
evolves, generally tending to eliminate some choices, i.e., to ordering.
If most choices were strategic (e.g., how many of my friends use a
given phone company), as it is reasonable to expect, evolution would
be very slow but noticeable, in agreement with real data. It is clear
that other mechanisms may be at work, but the one discussed here is
a first attempt to explain the dynamics of choice in real social net-
works and we hope it can stimulate further work in this direction.
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